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Citizenship and Family: Revisiting Dred Scott 
Jennifer M. Chacón∗ 
At its core, the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford1 was a case about 
family. The case was a tort claim filed by Dred Scott in response to 
an assault upon him and his family members.2 His citizenship claim 
was instrumental to the tort action, because his ability to sue the 
defendant, John Sanford, on a diversity jurisdiction theory required 
that the court acknowledge Dred Scott to be a “citizen” of a different 
state than the defendant.3 
The centrality of the issue of family, however, went well beyond 
the technical. One of the greatest evils of the institution of slavery 
was that it denied a group of human beings, legally defined as slaves, 
from keeping their families together.4 The historical record 
establishes that family unity was an important consideration in the 
Dred Scott case. Dred Scott’s desire to protect the integrity of his 
family unit served as a critical motivation behind his suit for 
freedom.5 Indeed, in their historical account of the case, Lea 
VanderVelde and Sandhya Subramanian have persuasively theorized 
that Harriet Scott—the “Mrs. Dred Scott” of the title of their article—
was the driving force behind her husband’s suit for freedom, and that 
 
 ∗ Acting Professor, University of California, Davis, School of Law. 
jmchacon@ucdavis.edu. J.D., Yale Law School, 1998; A.B., Stanford University, 1994. This 
Article was originally presented at the Twelfth Annual LatCrit Conference in Miami, Florida, 
on October 5, 2007. I would like to thank Rose Cuison Villazor for inviting me to participate on 
the panel, and to Kevin Maillard and George Martínez for enriching the discussion. I am also 
extremely grateful for the thought-provoking comments of Hiroshi Motomura on a later draft.  I 
am indebted to Chanin Changtor for his research assistance, to the staff of the U.C. Davis Law 
Library for their assistance, and to outgoing Dean Rex Perschbacher for his constant support. 
 1. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). Defendant John Sanford’s name is misspelled in the 
U.S. Reports as “John Sandford.” In this Article, the author will use the correct spelling of the 
Defendant’s name, John Sanford. 
 2. Id. at 393. 
 3. Id. at 394. 
 4. See discussion infra at notes 37–41 and accompanying text. 
 5. See discussion infra at notes 27–36 and accompanying text. 
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her primary motivation to pursue their legal claim was her desire to 
keep their family together.6 
Regardless of the motivation, the outcome of the lawsuit is a well-
known historical fact. The Supreme Court rejected Dred Scott’s 
claim, first and foremost, on jurisdictional grounds.7 The Supreme 
Court concluded that a federal court lacked jurisdiction to hear Dred 
Scott’s claims because he was not a “citizen” and therefore could not 
sue in federal court under a theory of diversity jurisdiction.8 Justice 
Taney infamously reached his conclusion with the sweeping 
explanation that, at the time of the enactment of the Constitution, 
Black people had “no rights which the white man was bound to 
respect.”9 The Dred Scott decision, issued by a divided Supreme 
Court, with a lengthy and sweeping opinion by Justice Taney, has 
come to stand with a small handful of cases as a low point of 
American constitutional jurisprudence.10 
In spite of the unsuccessful lawsuit, however, the Scott family 
ultimately was successful in their underlying quest. They obtained 
their freedom,11 and thereby kept their family intact.12 In this regard, 
the Scott family’s story demonstrates that one’s ability to keep a 
family unified has not, and should not, turn on formal citizenship. 
Once the Scott family was able to escape the bonds of slavery, the 
most significant legal threat to their familial unity dissolved, even 
though they were still denied their citizenship by the Supreme 
Court’s Dred Scott opinion. 
 
 6. Lea VanderVelde & Sandhya Subramanian, Mrs. Dred Scott, 106 YALE L.J. 1033 
(1997). 
 7. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 394 (1865). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 407. 
 10. In this regard, the decision is often grouped alongside Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537 (1896) (upholding racial segregation in public accommodations); Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the internment of Japanese Americans). 
 11. WALTER EHRLICH, THEY HAVE NO RIGHTS: Dred SCOTT’S STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM 
182 (1979) (“[O]n May 26, 1857, Dred and Harriet Scott appeared in the Circuit Court of St. 
Louis County with Taylor Blow, who formally freed them.”) 
 12. The family was together in 1857, when a photographer approached the family. Lea 
VanderVelde & Sandhya Subramanian, Mrs. Dred Scott, 106 YALE L.J. 1033, 1074 (1997). 
Famous photographs of the family were taken by St. Louis photographer J.H. Fitzgibbons, and 
these portraits appeared in an issue of Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper on June 27, 1857. 
WALTER EHRLICH, THEY HAVE NO RIGHTS: DRED SCOTT’S STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM 183 
(1979). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol27/iss1/4
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This Article explores the implications of the Dred Scott case for 
modern questions about family unity as it is affected by U.S. 
immigration law and policy. Part I elaborates on Dred Scott’s story, 
illustrating the central role that family unity played in the case. Part II 
focuses on the arc of history as it extends from Dred Scott to the 
present, demonstrating that the historical narrative of the Dred Scott 
case has often been used as a rallying cry for thicker, more robust 
conceptions of citizenship and for “equal citizenship.” Part III argues 
that, when it comes to the right to family integrity, a contemporary 
re-reading of the story of the Dred Scott family and a reexamination 
of the legacy of the Dred Scott decision might actually favor a 
decoupling of the right to family integrity and the rights associated 
with formal citizenship. In lieu of a more robust definition of 
citizenship that encompasses the right to family integrity, perhaps the 
Dred Scott case and its aftermath counsel us to move toward a more 
human-rights centered definition of the right to family integrity, 
applicable to all persons subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. laws. Part 
IV concludes that a broader understanding of the right to family 
would require revisions to certain components of U.S. immigration 
laws that pose clear, and sometimes unnecessary, barriers to family 
integrity. 
I. DRED SCOTT: A CASE ABOUT FAMILY 
In a recent article entitled Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred Scott, 
Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson provide thirteen reasons why the 
Dred Scott case “continues to deserve a central place in the cannon of 
American constitutional law.”13 The rich facts of the Dred Scott case 
provide Professors Balkin and Levinson with their first reason for 
according the case canonical status.14 Focusing on those facts 
provides a starting point for understanding the concerns at the heart 
of the case. 
The detailed facts that preface Justice Taney’s opinion in the case 
provide a great deal of information about the family whose claim 
 
 13. Jack M. Balkin & Sandford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred Scott, 82 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 49, 50 (2007). 
 14. Id. at 50. 
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hung in the balance in the matter of Dred Scott v. Sandford.15 The 
reader learns that in 1834, Dred Scott traveled with his legal owner, 
Dr. Emerson, from the slave state of Missouri to a military post at 
Rock Island, in the free state of Illinois.16 Mr. Scott remained there 
with Dr. Emerson until April or May of 1836.17 From there, Mr. Scott 
traveled with Dr. Emerson to Fort Snelling, described in the opinion 
as “situate[d] on the west bank of the Mississippi river, in the 
Territory known as Upper Louisiana, acquired by the United States of 
France, and situate[d] north of the latitude of thirty-six degrees thirty 
minutes north, and north of the State of Missouri.”18 In other words, 
Dred Scott remained in free territory.19 The reader also learns that in 
1835, Harriet was brought to Fort Snelling by her legal owner, Major 
Taliaferro, and that in 1836, Major Taliaferro sold and delivered her 
to Dr. Emerson.20 Moreover, the opinion tells the reader about the 
marriage of Dred Scott and Harriet: they were married in 1836, “with 
the consent of said Dr. Emerson.”21 The reader learns that the couple 
had two children, Eliza and Lizzie. Eliza was born on the steamboat 
Gipsey on the north side of the State of Missouri (bounded by free 
country) and Lizzie was born in the State of Missouri at a military 
 
 15. The facts set forth in the opinion have been supplemented in numerous detailed 
historical and legal accounts of the Dred Scott case. See, e.g., AUSTIN ALLEN, ORIGINS OF THE 
DRED SCOTT CASE: JACKSONIAN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1837–1857 
(2006); MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006); 
Dennis K. Boman, The Dred Scott Case Reconsidered: The Legal and Political Context in 
Missouri, 44 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 405 (2000); David Skillen Bogen, The Maryland Context of 
Dred Scott: The Decline in the Legal Status of Maryland Free Blacks, 1776–1810, 34 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 381 (1990); Lea VanderVelde & Sandhya Subramanian, Mrs. Dred Scott, 106 
YALE L.J. 1033 (1997); John S. Vishneski III, What the Court Decided in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 373 (1988); WALTER EHRLICH, THEY HAVE NO RIGHTS: 
DRED SCOTT’S STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM (1979); DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT 
CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978). 
 16. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 397 (1856). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See, e.g., PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANFORD: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH 
DOCUMENTS 8 (1997) (describing the free territory carved out to the north of thirty-six degrees 
and thirty minutes north latitude established by the Missouri Compromise). 
 20. Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 398. 
 21. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol27/iss1/4
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post called Jefferson Barracks.22 At the time of the Dred Scott 
decision, Eliza was fourteen and Lizzie was seven.23  
Reviewing the case, the reader can follow the progress of the 
growing family, as Dred and Harriet Scott moved with Eliza from 
Fort Snelling to the State of Missouri in 1938. The statement of facts 
also explains that before the commencement of the lawsuit in 
question, “Dr. Emerson sold and conveyed the plaintiff, said Harriet, 
Eliza and Lizzie, to the defendant [Sanford], as slaves, and the 
defendant ha[d] ever since claimed to hold . . . each of them as 
slaves.”24 Much more rich and detailed accounts of the Scott family 
history are available to the interested reader,25 but as Professors 
Balkin and Levinson observed, from the “relatively lengthy ‘agreed 
statement of facts,’. . . we can glean a fair amount about the actual 
people at the heart of the case.”26 
We also learn that the incident upon which Dred Scott based his 
suit involved an assault on his family. The case was, after all, an 
action of trespass vi et armis, in which Dred Scott claimed that 
Sanford had assaulted him, his wife, Harriet, and his daughters, Eliza 
Scott and Lizzie Scott.27 Sanford was alleged to have “laid his hands 
upon”28 them, and in the language of the Court, “imprisoned them, 
doing in this respect, however, no more than what he might lawfully 
do if they were of right his slaves at such times.”29 Thus, Sanford’s 
response to the trespass action was not to deny his actions, but to 
respond that the plaintiff, along with Harriet, Eliza, and Lizzie Scott, 
were his slaves, which gave him the legal right to restrain them as he 
had.30 
The account of Sanford’s acts of violence in the text of the Dred 
Scott decision is mundane and dry. Much like the words “Terry frisk” 
in the constitutional criminal procedural context,31 the Court’s 
 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id.  
 25. See supra note 15. 
 26. See supra note 13, at 50. 
 27. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 397 (1856). 
 28. Id. at 398. 
 29. Id. at 397. 
 30. Id.  
 31. The term “Terry frisk” is used to describe a pat down of the outer clothing of a person 
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description fails to convey the indignity and intrusiveness of 
Sanford’s actions.32 Other narratives clarify that on January 1, 1853, 
Sanford confronted the Scotts over their suit for freedom in state 
court.33 Accusing them of being “worthless and insolent,” Sanford 
whipped Dred and Harriet Scott and locked them in a barn, and then 
whipped Eliza and Lizzie.34 Dred Scott’s federal suit for freedom 
was, in significant part, a means to protect himself and his family 
from these sorts of acts of violence and containment.  
Of course, the theme of family integrity in the Dred Scott story 
runs much deeper than the incident that gave rise to the federal 
lawsuit. Obviously, Dred Scott had sued for freedom in state court 
before these events had even unfolded.35 But the concerns about 
family that drove the Scotts to seek freedom pre-dated the 1853 
incident, and were rooted in more general concerns regarding the 
vulnerability of slave families. Recent historiography of the Dred 
Scott case has highlighted the centrality of family integrity to the 
Dred Scott claim.36 
One of the most pernicious effects of the slave system was the 
denial of the rights of enslaved individuals to protect the integrity of 
their families. Peggy Cooper Davis has noted that the denial of family 
bonds was a “hallmark of slave status.”37 The process of breaking up 
 
upon reasonable suspicion that the person poses a threat to officer safety. Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 30 (1968).  
 32. Even in its decision to allow the “frisks,” the Court acknowledged that they 
constituted a “serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great 
indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.” Id. at 17. 
 33. Barbara B. Woodhouse, Dred Scott’s Daughters: Nineteenth Century Urban Girls at 
the Intersection of Race and Patriarchy, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 669, 686 (2000) (citing CHARLES 
MORROW WILSON, THE DRED SCOTT DECISION 21–22 (1973)). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See VanderVelde & Subramanian supra note 6, at 1059 n.111. 
 36. See generally supra note 15 (listing several sources of the historical account of the 
Scott story). 
 37. PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY 
VALUES 30 (1997); see also James W. Fox, Jr., Intimations of Citizenship: Repressions and 
Expressions of Citizenship in the Era of Jim Crow, 50 HOW. L.J. 113, 179 (2006) (“[O]ne of the 
most oppressive powers held by slave owners was the power to legally control families by 
dividing families at the sole will of the slave owner.”); THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN 
SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619–1860, at 96–99 (1996). Historians and social scientists of the 
twentieth century developed various theories concerning the impact this had upon the social 
structure of African American communities.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol27/iss1/4
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families was not merely an incidental means of maximizing the 
economic utility of each individual slave. During the period of 
slavery, this process was used as a systematic means of 
dehumanizing Blacks and destabilizing the social institutions from 
which they drew strength.38 The disruption of familial bonds was a 
way slaveholding societies attempted to “usurp[ ] the political and 
moral autonomy of the enslaved . . . “ through the “elimination of all 
possible sources of social value other than the slavemaster.”39 
Contemporary historians have taken important steps to document and 
chronicle the amazing resilience demonstrated by slaves in preserving 
their social networks and institutions—including the family—during 
this period.40 Nevertheless, this literature also makes clear how truly 
oppressive the institution of slavery was, and how much perseverance 
was required to survive and thrive in the face of such systematic 
dehumanization.41  
Concerns regarding family disruption were certainly a factor that 
the Scott family had to be contemplating when Dred and Harriet 
Scott brought their suit for freedom.42 Prior to Dr. Emerson’s death, 
Dred and Harriet Scott had little reason to fear that their family would 
be separated.43 Although they were Dr. Emerson’s slaves, it is quite 
possible that they felt secure enough about their family integrity that 
they undertook “a willing subordination to one coercive institution—
slavery—in exchange for another range of freedom.”44 It is possible 
 
 38. See Fox supra note 37, at 179. 
 39. Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1348, 1362 (1994). 
 40. David Brion Davis, A Review of the Conflicting Theories on the Slave Family, J. 
BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. Summer 1997, at 100–03. 
 41. Id. See also HERBERT G. GUTMAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, 
257–327 (1976); EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES 
MADE (1972). 
 42. Initially, Harriet Scott filed her own suit for freedom, but the lawyers who brought the 
case eventually sublimated her claim to Dred Scott’s. See VanderVelde & Subramanian, supra 
note 6, at 1059–60. VanderVelde and Subramanian argue that this decision might have been a 
fatal blow to the claim as Harriet Scott had a stronger claim to freedom than Dred Scott. Id. at 
1060. 
 43. See generally VanderVelde & Subramanian, supra note 6, at 1069–72. 
 44. See VanderVelde & Subramanian, supra note 6, at 1069. 
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that they hoped to be freed by Dr. Emerson or that they simply did 
not realize they had a legal right to sue for their freedom.45 
Regardless of their motivations for remaining with Dr. Emerson, 
the Scott family was clearly more fortunate than many other slave 
families as they were able to stay together in the period prior to Dred 
Scott’s suit for freedom.46 However, Dr. Emerson’s death raised the 
serious possibility that the Scott family would be divided.47 This may 
have prompted the Scotts to begin their suit for freedom against Irene 
Emerson, the wife of the deceased Dr. Emerson, in the 1840s.48 When 
the claim in Missouri courts ultimately proved unsuccessful, Dred 
Scott brought his diversity action against John Sanford, who was, by 
that time, the legal owner of every member of the Scott family.49 The 
fact that the Scotts’ daughters were placed in a secure, undisclosed 
location while this lawsuit was pending, demonstrates the degree to 
which the family feared the possibility of dissolution and the sale of 
individual members.50 
Ultimately, although the Scotts were notoriously unable to secure 
their citizenship or their freedom through the courts, they were 
successful in holding their family together. After the case was lost, 
Dred, Harriet, Eliza and Lizzie Scott were freed.51 Dred Scott worked 
as a porter in a St. Louis Hotel until his death in 1958.52 Harriet Scott 
was retained as a washerwoman to the Blow family, who also hired 
the two Scott daughters.53 In other words, although they were denied 
not only freedom but also citizenship by the United States Supreme 
Court, after obtaining their freedom directly from their owner, the 
Scotts confronted no laws that called into question their cohabitation 
as a unified family even though they lacked citizenship. Their ability 
 
 45. FINKELMAN, supra note 19, at 19. 
 46. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 13, at 53. 
 47. VanderVelde & Subramanian, supra note 6, at 1071. 
 48. Austin Allen, Rethinking Dred Scott: New Context for an Old Case, 82 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 141, 165 (2007) (citing WALTER EHRLICH, THEY HAVE NO RIGHTS: DRED SCOTT’S 
STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM 41–46 (1979) for an account of the trial-level proceedings). 
 49. Allen, supra note 48, at 165. 
 50. VanderVelde & Subramanian, supra note 6, at 1074.  
 51. WALTER EHRLICH, THEY HAVE NO RIGHTS: DRED SCOTT’S STRUGGLE FOR 
FREEDOM, at 181, 182 (1979). 
 52. EHRLICH, supra note 51, at 182.  
 53. EHRLICH, supra note 51, at 182. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol27/iss1/4
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to remain together in this country was never questioned.  Thus, while 
freedom from slavery was central to the Scott family’s ability to 
preserve its unity, citizenship was not.  
Threats to family integrity in the contemporary United States are 
no longer posed by laws sanctioning the institution of slavery, but 
these threats have not been entirely dissipated. One notable example 
is U.S. immigration and naturalization law, which sometimes 
operates to bar family unification in the United States and sometimes 
results in the removal of family members from the United States.54 
As a result of these laws, citizenship rights have come to play an 
important role in determining the extent to which many families are 
entitled to remain unified in the United States. In the next section, 
this Article explores how the right to family integrity has become 
linked to citizenship in the period following the Dred Scott decision. 
II. RECONSTRUCTION THROUGH THE MODERN ERA: CITIZENSHIP 
AND FAMILY 
The Reconstruction Amendments, which were drafted as a means 
of constitutionalizing the emancipation of slaves and the end of 
slavery, offered a direct response to the jurisprudence of the Dred 
Scott case. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished the institution of 
slavery endorsed by the Court in Dred Scott.55 The citizenship clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment56 rebuts Justice Taney’s notion (later 
echoed in the so-called Black Codes enacted in southern states in the 
aftermath of the Civil War) that Black people—even free Black 
people—could never be citizens.57 The citizenship clause affirms the 
fact that all people born “subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States,” regardless of race, are U.S. citizens.58 Although the Court 
later limited application of this principle, denying its applicability to 
the members of American Indian tribes59 and residents of the 
 
 54. See discussion infra at Section III. 
 55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 57. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426–27 (1856). 
 58. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 59. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884). The right of citizenship for these tribal members 
is provided by statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2000) (declaring a citizen and national at birth “a 
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territories,60 thus far, the proposition actually has managed to 
withstand challenges based on claims of racial ineligibility for 
citizenship.61 Thus, in the case of Wong Kim Ark, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the notion of birthright citizenship for a Chinese-American 
man, born on U.S. soil, even during a period when racist laws 
prohibited the naturalization of Chinese people born abroad.62 
The citizenship clause does not expressly enumerate the rights to 
which these newly-defined “citizens” were entitled. Even read in 
conjunction with the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibited the 
denial or abridgement of citizens’ right to vote “on account of race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude,”63 the “citizenship” 
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment did not bestow full political 
citizenship on all of its members. Obviously, at the time of its 
enactment, it did not bestow full political citizenship on women, 
regardless of race.64 Thus, even as a guarantor of a very narrow 
 
person born in the United States to a member of an Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian, or other 
aboriginal tribe: Provided, That the granting of citizenship under this subsection shall not in any 
manner impair or otherwise affect the right of such person to tribal or other property”). 
 60. There are about thirty-five Insular Cases, dealing with issues relating to the 
governance of the territories of Cuba, Guam, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico. These cases 
established a separate constitutional status for people residing in those territories; ultimately, 
they did not accord them citizenship status. See Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 
YALE L.J. 909, 978 (1991); see also Rose Villazor, Birthright Citizenship in the U.S. Territories 
(2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing the history of the Insular 
Cases and their current application); Ediberto Román, The Citizenship Dialectic, 20 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 557, 585–89 (2006). 
 61. Mae Ngai has noted that “access to citizenship, including birthright citizenship in the 
United States, is not fixed but politically contingent.” Mae Ngai, Birthright Citizenship and the 
Alien Citizen, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2521, 2526 (2007). In the 1980s, Peter H. Schuck and 
Rogers M. Smith argued that the denial of birthright citizenship to the children of 
undocumented immigrants would be constitutionally permissible. PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS 
M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 118 
(1985). More recently, John Eastman has argued for a reinterpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that would exclude children of undocumented workers from citizenship because 
they are not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States. Ngai, supra, at 2524 (citing John 
Eastman, Politics and the Court: Did the Supreme Court Really Move Left Because of 
Embarrassment over Bush v. Gore? 94 GEO. L.J. 1475, 1484 (2006)). Several members of 
Congress have introduced legislation to amend the constitution to exclude such children from 
citizenship. Id. at 2524 n.19. 
 62. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898); see also Lucy E. Salyer, Wong 
Kim Ark: The Contest Over Birthright Citizenship, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 51, 51–86 (Martin 
& Schuck eds., 2005) (discussing the case and its significance). 
 63. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 64. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874) (upholding statute denying 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol27/iss1/4










2008]  Revisiting Dred Scott 55 
 
 
conception of citizenship—where citizenship is viewed as a right to 
formal political participation—the Fourteenth Amendment was 
incomplete. 
The “privileges or immunities” clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment had the potential—ultimately unfulfilled—to imbue the 
citizenship clause with a concrete social, if not political, meaning.65 
At a minimum, the historical evidence suggests that the architects of 
the privileges or immunities clause intended to guarantee to citizens 
certain fundamental and traditional common law liberties from state 
control.66 Some scholars have argued that the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment intended a broader interpretation of the 
clause, and would read the clause to achieve a “refined 
incorporation” of particular constitutional rights and freedoms to the 
states.67 Many scholars have commented on the difficulties of 
establishing the appropriate scope of the clause,68 which has slipped 
into near total disuse.  
 
women the right to vote). For a discussion of the significance of this denial of the right to vote 
see JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION (1991). The 
denial of the franchise was remedied with the enactment of the Nineteenth Amendment. U.S. 
CONST. amend XIX. 
 65. See infra notes 75–76 and accompanying discussion. 
 66. Richard A. Epstein has theorized: 
First . . . a fair reading of the evolution of privileges and immunities clearly implies 
that it is only traditional liberties, with equal weight on both terms, that are protected. 
Second, it seems clear that privileges and immunities cover only what are commonly 
called negative liberties, or claims of independence from state control. They do not 
cover the wide variety of claims for positive benefits or services from the state which 
are covered by standard interpretations of the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clause.  
Richard A. Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons: Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 334 (2005) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 67. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 
YALE L.J. 1193 (1992). 
 68. See Epstein, supra note 64 (characterizing the scope of the privileges or immunities 
clause as a “mystery, “ and resolving the issue with a narrow interpretation); Charles Fairman, 
Does The Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 138–39 
(1949) (examining the historical record and noting that “[t]he debates never established what 
was to be the basis or measure of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. 
Congress . . . undoubtedly purposed . . . to establish a federal standard below which state action 
must not fall. At this point thinking became hazy.”); Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 
1976 Term: Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 12 (1977) (concluding that “[w]hatever else they may have sought to do, the framers of the 
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In addition to its citizenship guarantees, the Fourteenth 
Amendment also provides a floor of rights protection to all persons, 
whether or not those persons are citizens. Through the passage of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Reconstruction Congress took aim at the 
restrictive notion of citizenship encountered in the Dred Scott case, as 
well as its broader claim that noncitizens have no rights under the 
U.S. Constitution.69 In addition to mandating the bestowal of formal 
citizenship on all persons encompassed by the citizenship clause, the 
Fourteenth Amendment secures to all persons subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States “due process of law” and “equal 
protection of the laws.”70 Congress easily could have limited the due 
process and equal protection guarantees to citizens.71 Instead, they 
made a critical distinction between those guarantees and the 
citizenship clause by making the subsequent clauses applicable to 
“any person within [U.S.] jurisdiction.”72 Scholars and jurists 
continue to contest the scope of substantive rights carried in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause,73 as well as the 
meaning. 
The four guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment—birthright 
citizenship, protection from the abridgement of a citizen’s privileges 
and immunities, due process, and equal protection guarantees for all 
persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States—each respond 
to certain aspects of the Dred Scott decision. The citizenship clause 
and the privileges or immunities clause addressed the Supreme 
 
fourteenth amendment intended to validate the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and to write its main 
provisions into the Constitution.”) (emphasis added). 
 69. Because the Dred Scott court denied the applicability of basic legal protections to 
noncitizens, one scholar recently noted that the decision “recognized and tacitly endorsed . . . 
tiered personhood.” Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Dred Scott: Tiered Citizenship and Tiered 
Personhood, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 209, 211 (2007). 
 70. Id. 
 71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. 
 72. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added). 
 73. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, n.6 (1989) (taking issue with Justice 
Brennan’s dissent as to the appropriate level of generality upon which to assess whether a right 
has traditionally received protection under the due process clause); compare John Ely, 
Democracy and Distrust 18 (1980) (arguing that “substantive due process” is an inherently 
nonsensical concept, lacking textual basis); with LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHOICES 10 (198_) (critiquing Ely’s own process-based theory as “determin[ing] almost 
nothing unless its presuppositions are specified, and its content supplemented by a full theory of 
substantive rights and values.”). 
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Court’s racial limitations on citizenship, and also sought to imbue 
citizens with certain basic rights against the state governments. The 
due process and equal protection clauses sought to provide certain 
process guarantees whenever the United States exercised jurisdiction 
over any person. In other words, after the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, no person subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States could be said to have “no rights that the white man was 
bound to respect.”74 
In the post-Reconstruction Era, restrictive judicial interpretations 
undercut some of the promises of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
distorted Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence in a way that 
reverberates even today. Only five years after its enactment, the 
privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
rendered all but a dead letter by the Supreme Court’s restrictive 
interpretation of the clause in the Slaughter-House Cases.75 Later, 
courts, concerned with giving substance to the rights of citizenship, 
relied instead on the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, giving rise to the development of substantive due 
process rights. Thus, one long-term distortion of post-Reconstruction 
Era limitations on the privileges or immunities clause is that 
“substantive due process” is doing constitutional work that, at least 
arguably, may be more properly addressed in the (citizenship-based) 
privileges or immunities clause.76 It is perhaps an ironic, and 
certainly an unintended, byproduct of the Slaughter-House Cases, 
which all but eliminated the clause as a rights-protective doctrine, 
that many of the privileges and immunities of citizenship are now 
protected through the application of the due process clause, which 
applies to all persons. 
Often, one distortion leads to another. Just as the demise of the 
privileges or immunities clause led later justices of the Supreme 
 
 74. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (How. 19) 393, 407 (1856). 
 75. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). But see Kevin C. 
Newsome, Setting Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 
109 YALE L.J. 643 (2000) (arguing that the case has been interpreted over-broadly in 
intervening years by the Court and commentators); Robert C. Palmer, The Parameters of 
Constitutional Reconstruction: Slaughter-House, Cruikshank, and the Fourth Amendment, 1984 
U. ILL. L. REV. 739 (same). 
 76. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 13, at 57. 
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Court to search for another vehicle to lend substance to the rights of 
citizens, efforts to cabin citizenship rights from procedural due 
process and equal protection have spurred judicial decisions in which 
due process and equal protection rights are discussed as a right of 
citizens.77 This approach was invoked by the Warren Court even in 
its efforts to strike down laws that reinforced racial hierarchies.78 
Interestingly, even when the Court applies due process and equal 
protection norms, which apply to all people, the Court discusses the 
underlying rights at issue as “citizenship rights”.79  
Citizenship, in this conception, is not simply concerned with 
formal political rights, but instead encompasses a bundle of social 
and economic rights. The classic formulation of this position was laid 
out by T.H. Marshall, who argued that political notions of citizenship 
were incomplete, and that full citizenship required formal social, 
economic, and cultural equality.80 Such an interpretation of 
“citizenship” would justifiably place the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
citizenship clause and privileges or immunities clause at the center of 
efforts to eradicate forms of “second class citizenship” for racial 
minorities embodied in cases like Plessy v. Ferguson.81 Citizenship is 
still invoked by scholars as the basis for claims regarding social 
goods such as education.82 
 
 77. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizenship Talk: A Revisionist Narrative, 69 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1689, 1691–94 (2001); see also M. Isabel Medina, Exploring the Use of the Word 
“Citizen” in Writings on the Fourth Amendment, 83 INDIANA L. J. (2008) (forthcoming) (draft 
on file with author) (noting the frequency with which federal courts erroneously discuss Fourth 
Amendment rights, including those incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause, as a citizenship right).  
 78. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down Virginia’s anti-
miscegenation laws on due process and equal protection grounds, but discussing the right to 
marry as a right of citizens); cf. Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 1692 (“significantly, the Warren 
court’s equality campaign was not waged on behalf of aliens.”). 
 79. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.  
 80. T. H. MARSHALL, Citizenship and Social Class, in SOCIOLOGY AT THE CROSSROADS 
67 (1963); but see Peter H. Schuck, Citizenship in a Post-9/11 World, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2531, 2535 (2007) (positing that such discussions are “not really about citizenship, but about 
equality. It is a debate about the appropriate scope and content and normative justifications for 
the welfare state.”) For a discussion of the various meanings of citizenship, see LINDA 
BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 17–20 
(Princeton University Press) (2006). 
 81. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (rejecting a challenge to a law requiring racial segregation in 
public railway cars on both Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds). 
 82. See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 
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The problem with centering on citizenship as a means of 
achieving formal equality or due process protections is that 
citizenship is a bounded and exclusionary concept.83 Alexander 
Aleinikoff has pointed out that expanding rights through an 
expansive notion of citizenship necessarily comes at the expense of 
those who lay outside of the citizenship framework.84 As a matter of 
constitutional law, it excludes many people who might also be 
viewed as the subject of the Constitutional’s rights and protections: 
the immigrant (or “alien”), tribal members and people in the 
territories.85 In short, centering on citizenship as the vehicle for the 
delivery of rights can have the effect of presumptively excluding 
noncitizens not only from political, but also economic and social 
rights and liberties.86 
The erroneous judicial construction of due process protection as a 
right of citizenship inadvertently fuels the dangerous possibility of 
the reemergence of a domestic caste structure, which is 
fundamentally at odds with the intent of the Reconstruction 
Amendments.87 Indeed, after the Warren Court’s efforts to enhance 
rights through a robust understanding of the rights of citizens, later 
 
330, 335 (2006) (“Before the Fourteenth Amendment mandates equal protection of the laws, it 
guarantees national citizenship. This guarantee is affirmatively declared; it is not merely 
protected against state abridgment. Moreover, the guarantee does more than designate a legal 
status. Together with Section 5, it obligates the national government to secure the full 
membership, effective participation, and equal dignity of all citizens in the national community. 
This obligation, I argue, encompasses a legislative duty to ensure that all children have 
adequate educational opportunity for equal citizenship.”) (emphasis added). See also Webcast: 
Panel 2 comments of John A. Powell at the 150th Anniversary of Dred Scott v. Sandford: Race, 
Citizenship & Justice, held by Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice at 
Harvard Law School (Apr. 6, 2006), available at http://www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/ 
Events/Event.aspx?id=100027.  
 83. Linda Bosniak, Varieties of Citizenship, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2449, 2450 (2007). 
 84. Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 1692 (“By defining insiders, the concept of citizenship 
necessarily defines outsiders; and by guaranteeing full and equal rights for those within the 
charmed circle, it supports fewer rights—or at least less attention—for those outside the 
circle.”). 
 85. Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 1692.  
 86. Bosniak, supra note 83, at 2449–50. 
 87. For a discussion of Dred Scott as caste-based and the anti-precedent for anti-caste 
principles, see Webcast: Panel 4 comments of Cass R. Sunstein at the 150th Anniversary of 
Dred Scott v. Sandford: Race, Citizenship & Justice, held by Charles Hamilton Houston 
Institute for Race and Justice at Harvard Law School (Apr. 6, 2006), http://www.charles 
hamiltonhouston.org/events/event.aspx?id=100027 (then follow “Webcast—Panel 4” hyperlink 
under “Links”). 
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courts were able to leverage this reasoning as a means for limiting 
due process and equal protection for noncitizens.88  
The Reconstruction Amendments, read as a reaction to 
constitutional slavery and the Dred Scott decision, point toward a 
different understanding of the relationship between rights and 
citizenship—one which guarantees full political participation to 
citizens, and which also provides some level of basic rights 
protection to all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States, 
whether citizens or not. The story of the Dred Scott family counsels 
against the use of “citizenship” as an absolute dividing line between 
those who possess rights and liberties and those who do not.89 
Of course, such a statement raises some very basic questions. 
Most important among these questions is: What rights and liberties, if 
any, are guaranteed to both noncitizens and citizens by the post-
Reconstruction Constitution? What are the “due process” guarantees 
provided to all persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction? Answering these 
questions requires the identification of rights and liberties so 
fundamental that neither citizens nor noncitizens can be denied these 
rights. In answering these questions, it is useful to focus on the ways 
in which the Reconstruction Amendments can be read to redress the 
denial of rights achieved by the Supreme Court in Dred Scott. 
III. BUILDING THE FLOOR: FREE PEOPLE AND CITIZENS IN THE POST-
RECONSTRUCTION ERA 
Unlike the voting guarantees of the later-enacted Fifteenth 
Amendment, which are limited in scope to citizens,90 the anti-slavery 
 
 88. Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 1693 (arguing that the Rehnquist Court “used citizenship 
as a sword, wielded on behalf of individuals to cut down government actions on behalf of 
groups” while “upholding government action against aliens that would not be tolerated if 
imposed on citizens.”); see also David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002) 
(discussing the ways in which post-September 11, 2001 security measures, including those 
upheld by the courts, have eroded further the due process protections of noncitizens). 
 89. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 13, at 56. Professors Balkin and Levinson also 
remind the reader of Alexander Bickel’s suspicion of using citizenship “as a gatekeeper for 
whether people could possess basic rights and liberties against the state.” Id. at 56; see also 
(ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 52–54 (1975). 
 90. U.S. CONST. amend. XV (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not 
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude” (emphasis added)). 
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guarantees of the Thirteenth Amendment are generally applicable. No 
person can be enslaved within the jurisdiction of the United States by 
the State or by a private actor.91 The Reconstruction Congress’ 
understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment provides important 
insights into the later enactments of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal protection 
clauses. 
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibited both slavery and 
involuntary servitude within the jurisdiction of the United States, and 
empowered Congress to enact laws to achieve this end.92 One might 
view this right narrowly—that is, one might read it as simply 
compelling the cessation of the practice of compelling another person 
to labor without pay. But, while Congress debated this Amendment, 
many members discussed the right in much broader terms. The 
Amendment was not simply about eradicating the unpaid labor 
structure, but about eradicating the many social institutions that gave 
rise to and reinforced the system of slavery.93 
Alexander Tsesis has noted that one of the primary social issues 
addressed as an “incident of slavery” was the mechanism of familial 
disruption.94 As previously noted, family disruption was central to the 
system of slavery.95 Therefore, it is not surprising that a discussion of 
the rights of families were an important part of Congressional debates 
over the Thirteenth Amendment.96  
Professor Tsesis has notes that during an 1864 Senate debate of 
the Thirteenth Amendment, Senator James Harlan of Iowa urged that 
“interference with parental and marital relationships” constituted an 
 
 91. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 92. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. Other scholars have previously noted the difficulties of 
interpreting the meaning of this Amendment in modern times and the crabbed evolution of 
interpretations of the Amendment. See, e.g., Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth 
Amendment and Slavery in the Global Economy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 974–79 (2002); 
Guyora Binder, The Slavery of Emancipation, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2063, 2063–64 (1996). 
 93. The discussion in the following two paragraphs is drawn from a brief discussion in 
footnote 188 of an article that I recently published in the Wisconsin Law Review. See Jennifer 
M. Chacón, Loving Across Borders, 2007 WISC. L. REV. 345, 375–76 & n.188 (2007).  
 94. See supra text accompanying notes 37–41; ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 37–48, 121–27 (2004). 
 95. See supra text accompanying notes 37–41. 
 96. ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 37–
48, 121–27 (2004). 
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example of “the incidents of servitude” that the Thirteenth 
Amendment was designed to preclude.97 Senator Henry Wilson stated 
that, were the Amendment to pass, “[i]n place of slavery’s chains, 
federal law would respect natural rights by protecting family 
interests.”98 Ebson Ingersoll, a Representative from Illinois and 
advocate of the Thirteenth Amendment, noted that one of the most 
problematic aspects of slavery was the fact that it separated families, 
leaving whole segments of society without the “right to the 
endearments and enjoyment of family ties.”99 
These comments suggest that, in the view of at least some 
Members of Congress, the Thirteenth Amendment was concerned 
with more than just ending the labor arrangements that defined 
enslavement: it was concerned with eradicating the system of slavery, 
which necessarily included the disregard for familial integrity that 
stood at the center of that institution. The Thirteenth Amendment 
performs an important anti-caste function in protecting the basic right 
of familial integrity, and this anti-caste function is a direct response 
to Justice Taney’s notion of the existence of subordinate and inferior 
beings who had “no rights” to protect their families, whether as 
slaves or free persons. 
Later cases have emphasized the link between family unity and 
personhood. These discussions have been rooted in the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.100 As Peggy Cooper Davis has 
observed, in cases like Meyers v. Nebraska101 and Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters,102 “the Court recognized the rights of individual and family 
autonomy and used language that evokes, but does not make explicit, 
 
 97. Alexander Tsesis, A Civil Rights Approach: Achieving Revolutionary Abolitionism 
Through the Thirteenth Amendment, 39 U.C. DAVIS J. REV. 1773, 1813–14 (2006). 
 98. Id. 
 99. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2990 (1864), reprinted in STATUTORY HISTORY 
OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 53 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970); see also NATHAN I. 
HUGGINS, BLACK ODYSSEY 154–82 (2d ed. 1990). 
 100. Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1348, 1369 (1994). 
 101. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down a state statute prohibiting 
German language instruction in the home as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment due 
process clause). 
 102. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down on Fourteenth 
Amendment due process grounds a state statute prohibiting students from attending private, 
religious schools). 
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the antislavery sensibilities favoring intellectual and moral 
independence.”103 The Court rooted its analysis in these and other 
cases concerning family,104 in the Fourteenth Amendment due 
process clause. But the guarantee of family unity or “family 
liberty”105 also clearly sounds in the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Understanding the centrality of family unity to the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s anti-slavery promise provides further constitutional 
grounding for Davis’ conclusion that “the idea of civil freedom that 
grows out of the history of slavery, antislavery, and Reconstruction 
entails . . . a right of family that derives from the human right of 
intellectual and moral autonomy.”106 
In sum, reading the Reconstruction Amendments together, as a 
response to Dred Scott, it is reasonable to conclude that the right to 
family unity is neither a citizenship right nor a privilege or immunity 
of citizenship. The history of the Thirteenth Amendment suggests 
that the right to family unity can be seen a part of the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s anti-slavery right.107 The Fourteenth Amendment 
assures that it is a right to which persons “subject to the jurisdiction” 
of the United States cannot be deprived of without “due process” of 
law.108 Thus, while there is no express constitutional guarantee of 
family unity, we can understand the Constitution to provide a 
guarantee that a deprivation of family unity will be imposed with 
appropriate due process considerations. “To think of family liberty as 
a guarantee offered in response to slavery’s denials of natal 
connection is to understand it, not as an end in itself, but as a means 
to full personhood.”109 
 
 103. Davis, supra note 39, at 1369. 
 104. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down a state law 
requiring sterilization of certain three-time felons); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 
(1977) (striking down ordinance that barred extended family members from living together in 
public housing unit). 
 105. Davis, supra note 39, at 1371. Davis, like the Court itself, locates this notion of family 
liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. Davis, supra note 39, at 1369. 
 106. Davis, supra note 39, at 1371. 
 107. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 108. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 109. Davis, supra note 39, a 1371. 
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IV. RESPECTING THE FLOOR: FAMILY UNITY AND IMMIGRATION 
LAW 
At present, one of the most important sites for the denial 
personhood through the abridgement of family liberty occurs in the 
regulation of immigration. In 2005, more than thirty-five million 
residents of the United States, or about twelve percent of the 
population, were immigrants.110 A significant sub-set of these 
immigrants are present without legal authorization. One estimate 
placed the number of undocumented migrants at 12 million as of 
March 2006.111 Millions of people in the United States live in mixed-
status families, in which one more members of the family are 
undocumented noncitizens. One out of every ten children in the 
United States is part of a mixed-status family.112 The practical 
consequence of the immigrant-heavy composition of the U.S. 
population is that laws regulating immigration and naturalization 
have a significant impact upon a substantial percentage of the 
population as a whole. 
In many cases, families with noncitizen members encounter 
significant challenges as a consequence of U.S. immigration laws. 
These challenges can take many forms. Immigration laws impose 
heightened state intrusions into marriages involving noncitizens,113 
 
 110. Steven A. Camarota, Immigrants at Mid-Decade: A Snapshot of America’s Foreign-
Born Population in 2005, 2005 CENTER FOR IMMIGR. STUD. BACKGROUNDER, 1, http://www. 
cis.org/articles/2005/back1405.pdf. 
 111. Estimates of the Unauthorized Migrant Population for States based on the March 
2005 CPS, (Pew Hispanic Center Fact Sheet), Apr. 26, 2006, at 2 http://pewhispanic.org/ 
factsheets/factsheet.php?FactsheetID=25.  
 112. Michael F. Fix, Wendy Zimmerman & Jeffrey S. Passel, The Integration of Immigrant 
Families in the United States, IMMIGRATION STUDIES (The Urban Institute), July 2001, at 15, 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/immig_integration.pdf. For a discussion of the 
implications of mixed-family status in family law, see David B. Thornson, Of Borders and Best 
Interests: Examining the Experiences of Undocumented Migrants in U.S. Family Courts, 11 
TEX. HISP. J. L. & POL’Y 45 (2005). 
 113. See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. 
L. REV. 1625, 1682–94 (2007) (discussing the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment 
(IMFA)); Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions 
and Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 697–718 (1997) (contesting the validity of 
the IMFA provisions that render marriage fraud a federal crime); Jesse I. Santana, The 
Proverbial Catch-22: The Unconstitutionality of Section Five of the Immigration Marriage 
Fraud Amendments of 1986, 25 CAL. W. L. REV. 1 (1988) (arguing that the IMFA violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Eileen P. Lynskey, Comment, Immigration Marriage Fraud 
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prevent certain categories of workers from bringing family members 
with them,114 impede efficient family reunification,115 or foreclose 
reunification altogether.116 It can result in the deportation of 
noncitizen family members, whether those family members are 
lawful permanent residents or undocumented migrants.117 This is true 
even if the deportation of a parent results in the constructive 
deportation of citizen children.118 In short, regardless of the nature of 
their immigration status, noncitizens (and their citizen relatives) can 
encounter a variety of obstacles to family integrity as a consequence 
of immigration law. 
Of course, immigration law is not the only area of law that 
impedes family integrity. A wide array of civil laws allow for state 
intervention in private family arrangements.119 The criminal law also 
imposes many disruptions to the integrity of families.120 Most 
notably, when one family member is sentenced to prison, the entire 
family is deeply affected.121 In this sense, immigration law cannot be 
 
Amendments of 1986: Till Congress Do Us Part, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1087 (1987) (making 
similar constitutional arguments against the IMFA). 
 114. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(H)(2)(b) (West 2005); see also Benjamin P. Quest, Comment, 
Process Theory and Emerging Thirteenth Amendment Jurisprudence: The Case of Agricultural 
Guestworkers, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 233, 258 (2006). 
 115. Jennifer M. Chacón, Loving Across Borders: Immigration Law and the Limits of 
Loving, 2007 WISC. L. REV. 345, 357–58 (2007). 
 116. Id. at 357–63 (discussing bars to same-sex partner unification and other limits on the 
nature of the relationships that entitle a family member to visa preferences). 
 117. Id. at 359–68. 
 118. Id. at 364–66; see also David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the 
Parent-Child Relationship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165 (2006) (discussing the dilemma of noncitizen 
parents with citizen children). 
 119. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (noting that “the state as 
parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring school attendance, regulating or 
prohibiting the child’s labor, and in many other ways”); see also Natalie Loder Clark, Parens 
Patriae and a Modest Proposal for the Twenty-First Century: Legal Philosophy and a New 
Look at Children’s Welfare, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 381, 403–14 (2000) (discussing increasing 
state interference in the raising of children). 
 120. See, e.g., Turner v. Safly, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987) (upholding a prisoner’s right to 
marry but implying that consummation may not take place until the end of the prison sentence). 
For a discussion of the ways that states should and should not take family ties into account in 
meting out criminal justice, see Dan Markel et al., Criminal Justice and the Challenge of 
Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1147 (2007). 
 121. TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES 
DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE (2007); Marc Mauer, Thinking About Prison and 
Its Impact in the Twenty-First Century, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 607, 611–12 (2005).  
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said to be the only area of the law that imposes significant 
interventions in family integrity. Moreover, U.S. immigration law 
actually privileges family ties in the ordering of immigration 
priorities.122 
Nevertheless, immigration law provides an interesting lens 
through which to evaluate the nature of the right to family integrity. 
As a doctrinal matter, when the rights of family intimacy collide with 
the government’s authority to regulate immigration, Congress’ 
plenary power to regulate immigration routinely trumps all other 
considerations. Taking the reconstructed Constitution seriously does 
not require a determination that the needs of family will always 
trump the prerogative of the state to regulate immigration. On the 
other hand, it might suggest the need to accord family interests more 
weight in immigration law and policy. 
At least five examples come to mind where the right of family 
integrity could easily be accorded greater status in immigration 
regulations without jeopardizing the government’s ability to 
meaningfully regulate immigration. First, spousal reunification 
provisions in the family-based immigration law categories can and 
should be expanded to take into account same-sex partners. 123 
Second, the serious backlogs for immediate family members of 
citizens and lawful permanent residents should be eliminated 
immediately, and steps should be taken to ensure that such backlogs 
do not develop again.124 Third, a small number of family reunification 
 
 122. Hiroshi Motomura, The Family and Immigration: A Roadmap for the Ruritanian 
Lawmaker, 43 AM. J. COMP L. 511 (1995) (comparing the ways in which U.S. and German 
immigration law define, accommodate and fail to accommodate family ties, and noting 
numerous provisions in U.S. law concerned with family reunification); Chacón, supra note 115, 
at 356–57 (explaining the family-based preference system that gives rise to the bulk of legal 
immigration into the U.S.). 
 123. See, e.g., Matthew Lister, A Rawlsian Argument for Extending Family-Based 
Immigration Benefits to Same Sex Couples, 37 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 745, 760–63 (2007) 
(discussing the current situation of same-sex couples under U.S. law); Christopher A. Dueñas, 
Note, Coming to America: The Immigration Obstacles Facing Binational Same-Sex Couples, 
73 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 821–23 (2000) (arguing that immigration laws should recognize same-
sex marriages); Victor C. Romero, The Selective Deportation of Same-Gender Partners: In 
Search of the “Rara Avis,” 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 537 (2002). 
 124. See Promoting Family Values and Immigration: Hearing on the role of Family-Based 
Immigration in the U.S. Immigration System Before the Subcomm. on Immigration of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary (May 8, 2007) (testimony of Bill Ong Hing, Professor of Law and 
Asian American Studies, University of California, Davis); Oversight Hearing on the Shortfalls 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol27/iss1/4
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visas should be allocated to individuals who do not fit traditional 
categories of “family,” but who can demonstrate status relationships 
with U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents that are akin to the 
family-based categories that already exist.125 Fourth, family ties ought 
to be accorded greater weight in removal proceedings. Immigration 
judges should have the discretion—as they once did—to grant 
cancellation of removal to a removable noncitizen who can 
demonstrate that her continued presence in the United States poses no 
threat, and that her removal will negatively impact U.S. citizen or 
lawful permanent resident family members.126 This list is not 
exhaustive,127 but it points to some of the most obvious areas where 
immigration law substantially interferes with family integrity . 
All of these policy changes could and should be made by 
Congress as part of any package of comprehensive immigration 
 
of the 1986 Immigration Reform Legislation Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, 
Refugees, Border Security and International Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Apr. 19, 
2007) (testimony of Stephen Legomsky, Professor of law, Washington University). 
 125. But cf. Monique Lee Hawthorne, Family Unity in Immigration Law: Broadening the 
Scope of Family, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 809, 827–29 (2007) (arguing that the United 
States should aim to adopt a more flexible statutory definitions of “family,” similar to that used 
in Canada). 
 126. This sort of discretion was routinely exercised under Section 212(c) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act as it existed prior to 1996. Scholars have called for its 
reinstatement or even broader forms of relief. See, e.g., BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR 
SOULS: VALUES MORALITY AND IMMIGRATION POLICY 58–64 (2006) (discussing the “rise and 
fall” of the 212(c) waiver). See also Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation 
Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 110–11 (1998) stating: 
(This [212(c)] waiver process protected the interests of the immigrant who may have 
built a life of work, family, and community based on the understanding that his or her 
past conviction would not lead to deportation. It also protected the interests of all of 
those whose lives were intertwined with that of the immigrant, including family 
members, employers, and the employees of immigrants who operated businesses. In 
practice, approximately half of the long time permanent residents who sought relief 
from deportation were granted such relief. Id. 
 Admittedly, such discretionary relief presents problems of its own. See, e.g., Daniel 
Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. 
Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 767–807 (1997) (outlining problems of judicial 
deference to improper exercises of discretion and recommending new standards). 
 127. For example, one scholar has suggested that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition on 
slavery should be read as a bar to the familial separation required under the current H-2A 
agricultural guestworker visa program, which does not permit the visa holder to be 
accompanied by family members. Benjamin P. Quest, Process Theory and Emerging Thirteenth 
Amendment Jurisprudence: The Case of Agricultural Guestworkers, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 233, 
238–39, 252–54, 258 (2006). 
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reform. Ironically, Congress gives every indication that it plans to 
move in precisely the opposite direction. The 2007 proposal for 
comprehensive immigration reform would have moved away from a 
family-centered immigration policy, and decreased the number of 
family-based immigrants visas issued each year.128 Overall, the bill 
would have substantially altered the admissions process to favor 
immigrants with special talents and skills.129 The bill also would have 
increased the categories of lawful permanent residents subject to 
removal.130 In exchange, a path to citizenship would have been 
established for some of the noncitizens currently present without 
authorization.131 Significantly, however, the bill left quite unclear 
whether and when anyone would actually have their status 
normalized, since the legalization was predicated upon certain 
difficult conditions involving the “securing” of the border.132 
Noncitizens and lawful permanent residents cannot vote. Their 
voices are not represented in majoritarian lawmaking schemes. It is 
therefore highly possible that Congress will act to limit, rather than to 
extend greater protection to, the family integrity of noncitizens. 
 
 128. The bill would have reduced the number of family-based visas from 480,000 to 
127,000. Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348 
110th Congress (2007) § 501. This reduction is all the more significant because the Senate bill 
would have subjected the parents of adult citizens to this numerical cap. S. 1348 § 502 
(subjecting parents to the cap and limiting their numbers to 40,000 a year). At present, such 
parents are not subject to a numeric cap. INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i)). The number of visas available 
for other kinds of family members would also shrink. S. 1348 § 502. 
 129. See Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 
1348 110th Congress (2007) § 502. In contrast, the current law assesses skill for employment 
visas, (INA § 203(b)), but not for family-based visas (INA §§ 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 203(a)). 
 130. For example, Senate 1348 § 503 expands the definition of “aggravated felony.” 
Lawful permanent residents who commit aggravated felonies are deportable. INA 
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii). The bill also would have made deportable “members” of “criminal street 
gangs” regardless of whether or not they have criminal convictions. Senate 1348 § 204. The bill 
would not have restored judicial discretion in cases involving aggravated felons. This discretion 
was eliminated in 1996 with the passage of IIRIRA, with harsh consequences for many lawful 
permanent residents and their family members. See BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR SOULS: 
VALUES, MORALITY AND IMMIGRATION POLICY 58–64 (comparing former INA § 212(c), 
which offered some discretionary relief from removal, with cancellation of removal under 
current law, which sharply limits relief from removal); Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking 
Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 107–14 
(same). 
 131. S. 1348 at Title VI.  
 132. Id. § 2. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol27/iss1/4














To date, the courts have rejected attempts to challenge Congress’ 
plenary power in the area of immigration, even where core familial 
rights are at stake. Reconsidering the Dred Scott story, and reflecting 
on the centrality of the Dred Scott decision to the Reconstruction 
Amendments, suggests that perhaps courts are not striking the right 
balance in this regard. Noncitizens subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States, along with their citizen relatives, are entitled to due 
process of law. These due process protections must extend to the 
protection of the family integrity that the Reconstruction Congress—
reacting to the institution of slavery—viewed as a basic right of all 
persons. 
Recognition of the rights of the noncitizens residing in the United 
States to assert claims of family integrity is not the same as 
guaranteeing all persons with family connections in the United States 
to enter and remain. Such recognition does, however, require treating 
close family bonds with a certain legal seriousness that is currently 
nonexistent in cases involving, for example, the removal of 
rehabilitated noncitizens with old convictions for crimes that have 
been reclassified as “aggravated felonies.” Due process demands that 
the life-long breakup of a family unit that is predicated on an old 
offense should require an evaluation of the facts of the case. 
The recognition that due process demands the consideration of 
certain basic rights such as family integrity is also not inconsistent 
with bounded conceptions of citizenship. It does not require the 
conferral of political membership on noncitizens. It does not even 
deny that certain social welfare benefits might be legitimately limited 
to citizens. But it does suggest that there ought to be a baseline of 
rights protections below which we cannot go with regard to any 
person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Current 
doctrinal approaches to the rights of noncitizens lack such a baseline. 
In the absence of a baseline, some families are as vulnerable now 
to being broken apart as the Scotts were over 150 years ago. Now, it 
is the U.S. government itself that not only enforces, but also enacts, 
the separation. In certain circumstances, the government should have 
that power. But to routinely read Congress’ ability to break up 
families as plenary is to ignore the social meaning of the 
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Reconstruction Amendments and to disregard the caste-enforcing 
character of such regulations. 
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